The Age of Surveillance in Myanmar
It was discovered that in 2024, the military junta not only imposed internet shutdowns, and monitored and arrested individuals for their online activities but also planned data collection projects for mass surveillance. On the ground, junta security forces also carried out unexpected mobile device inspections on people.
Additionally, it has been observed that the military junta established a committee to take action against politically motivated and sexually explicit content online. This committee is led by the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Home Affairs as its president, with the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Transport and Communication serving as its vice president.
The military junta has announced that Myanmar citizens holding visit passports (PV) will no longer be permitted to leave the other countries through airports for overseas employment.
SAC's Announcement on the Use of Mobile SIM Cards and
Bank Accounts Published in the October 21 Issue of the New Light of Myanmar Newspaper
Moreover, the military junta has announced that it will take action under existing laws against those who sell or lend their mobile SIM cards, mobile payment accounts, or bank accounts to others for financial benefit. Myanmar Now stated that after a visit to China by coup leader Min Aung Hlaing, the projects that China's assistance to the military council includes plans to provide facial recognition systems for use at checkpoints and hundreds of police vehicles.
As seen by a few of the above occurrences, attempts are underway in 2024 to track and regulate the public's every action, both online and offline.
(a) The Military Junta's Disregard for Data Protection and Privacy
In implementing the Surveillance state , it can clearly see that data protection and privacy of the individual have been disregarded. In the Waw Township, located in Bago Region, military personnel entered homes in villages such as Myitkyo, Letpan, Anyasu, Sin Ywa, and Ahtet Wainpat to inspect phones used by residents. And then, Kyaw Swar Telegram Channel, one of the pro-military supported telegram channels, instigated to check the mobile devices of individuals who are travelling.
Lobbying by Military Regime's Stooge Telegram Channels to Inspect Individuals' Mobile Phones
On May 30, the military junta tightened its regulations on VPN use. Following these increased restrictions, vehicle inspections at highway checkpoints included checking phones for VPN applications. Shwe Phee Myay News Agency reports that Junta security forces in Mandalay checked cell phones for VPN use and, when they were discovered, fined the users over hundred thousands of kyats. In a similar vein, junta security forces in Lashio threatened to detain anyone discovered using a VPN.
In Taung Thar and Pathein Townships, military personnel checked whether the VPN application was installed on mobile devices.
In the Yangon Region, specifically in the Kyaing Myin Taing, ၀n the other side of the river, Aok Yone/Sak San ward, military personnel entered homes and checked mobile phones for the presence of VPN applications. In the Ayeyarwady Region, in Nyang Thone, a young person was shot and arrested by junta security forces during a mobile phone VPN inspection.
These situations highlight that military personnel conducted searches of public mobile phones at will, without any court orders or legal authorization. These actions are evidence of violations of the digital rights of Myanmar citizens, including their right to privacy and protection of personal data.
Mekong News' Report on Military Propaganda Media Claims of Documenting and
Taking Action Against Resistance Supporters in Mogok
Mekong Media Outlet reported that SAC’s lobby channels delivered a message that in Mogoke, Mandalay Region, SAC listed and was arresting around 400 persons who supported the revolution.
Mekhong media outlet reported that SAC’s propaganda channels disseminated the message that in Mogoke, Mandalay Region, the military junta had compiled a list of around 400 revolution supporters and had started arresting them.
According to the media reports, following the floods in Myanmar in September, many accounts used for donations via KBZPay were blocked under allegations of money laundering.
It is evident from the aforementioned incidents that the military junta is closely observing people's money transactions in addition to keeping an eye on their online and offline activities.
(b) Personal Data of The Public and SAC’s UID/EID Project Status
The key criteria to complete the full surveillance mechanism of the military junta is to collect the accurate personal data of the public. It has been observed that the military council has been persistently working throughout 2024 to implement the process of issuing UID/EID systems in order to gain access to accurate personal data of the public.
Military Junta has used pressure in various types to compel the public to obtain UID/EID. In Hainggyikyun, over 50 locals who had not registered for UID/EID were interrogated and fined. Junta pressured these actions by claiming they were necessary for the election process, using this as a pretext to enforce UID/EID registration. In addition, citizens applying for passports were required to present their UID numbers in the office. Next, the military junta announced that border passes would only be issued to travelers crossing borders if they possessed both a national registration card and a UID certificate. The Ministry of Immigration and Population also announced that individuals travelling aboard are required to have the UID numbers. And then, the Ministry of Immigration and Population also announced that a person who uses the fake UID will be taken into action by existing laws. As this increases pressure to present UID cards for both domestic and international travel, people have faced circumstances where they were compelled to increasingly obtain UID cards.
(c) Census or Surveillance?
The military junta announced in February 2024 that it planned to collect nationwide census data in October 2024 and released the provisional population data in December 2024. Human Rights Activists, revolution forces, and digital security experts viewed the planned census as part of a mass surveillance effort targeting the public.
The military junta conducted its census data collection program from 1st October to 15th October. To complete its action, Junta used around 42,000 auditors/enumerators. On the day of the census, the military council pressured household heads or those capable of answering questions about the household to remain at home. Teachers were also coerced into participating in the census process as part of the military council's initiative.
Despite the military junta's claims that the census was being conducted nationwide, it was noted that certain crisis areas had left to gather the data. In that case, the military junta's census data collecting faced the challenge of obtaining an exact and correct data set.
A census is an essential data collection process for implementing a country's socio-economic programs. However, the public viewed the military junta's census initiative with uncertainty, questioning whether it was a genuine census or a surveillance operation, leaving its purpose unclear.
The Media Freedom Situations Is Becoming More Restricted
After the 2021 coup, the military junta repressed the various types of repression including revoking the media licences and arresting the journalists. According to the data collected by MIP, the military junta, since the military coup on February 1, has imprisoned numerous journalists. As of now, 47 journalists are still in custody and licenses for 15 media outlets have been revoked.
(a) Media repression occurrences that occurred in 2024
According to the data collected by MIP, at least( 4 )journalists have been arrested in 2024. As of right now, 44 journalists have been arrested and are being detained in different prisons. The military junta's activities have resulted in the deaths of (3) journalists in 2024.
The military junta’s Ministry of Information reported that it is collaborating with other ministries, including the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Transport and Communications, and the Ministry of Immigration and Population, to take measures against exiled media outlets: Mizzima, The Irrawaddy, Khit Thit, and Myanmar Now.
It was also found that a DMG reporter and an office staff had their charges the previously applied Telecommunications Law replaced with the more severe Counter-Terrorism Law. Additionally, the Dawei Watch reporter Ko Myo Myint Oo was sentenced to life imprisonment, and Ko Aung San Oo received a 20-year prison sentence, as ruled by the military court in Myeik. The Independent Myanmar Press Council (IPCM) condemned and denounced the sentencing of two Dawei Watch journalists to life imprisonment and 20 years in prison. However, it was observed that the military junta did not amend its action regarding its decision.
In 2024, incidents involving the deaths of journalists also occurred. In Kyaikto, DVB CJ reporter Ko Win Htut Oo (aka Faizal) and freelance journalist Ko Htet Myat Thu were killed during a military junta raid and shooting. During the battle in Thibaw, two journalists from Shwe Phi Myay and Than Lwin Khet sustained injuries while covering the news after being targeted by aerial bombings.Independent Myanmar Journalists Association (IMJA) stated that journalists in the country are facing various forms of repression.
Furthermore, according to the Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Myanmar ranks 173rd out of 180 countries in terms of press freedom.
(b) The Situation of Clashes Between Resistance Forces and
Media in Ethnic Regions
In 2024, we observed that, between the media and ethnic armed groups some clashes regarding the media matter.
The Karenni State Interim Executive Council published “Directive on the Media Code of Conduct” on April 16 that contained conflicting information regarding media freedom in the area. In the same vein, on April 21, the Karen National Union (KNU) issued “Policy and Regulations forConducting Tasks Relating to Information” for its region.
The Independent Press Council Myanmar (IPCM) released a statement expressing concerns that certain information included in the "Directive on the Media Code of Conduct" issued by the Karenni State Interim Executive Council on April 16, and the "Policy and Regulations for Conducting Tasks Relating to Information" issued by the Karen National Union, poses a threat to media freedom and the safety of journalists.
Four months after the clashes began, in August, following meetings between the Independent Press Council Myanmar (IPCM) and the Karen National Union (KNU), they issued a joint Statement of Cooperation on Independent Media Policies.
Similarly, Independent Press Council of Myanmar(IPCM) and Public Relations & Information Committee, Interim Executive Council of Karenni State (IEC) met online on October 16, to discuss coordination on media policies and information access concerns.
An incident occurred in which the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) detained two journalists based in Hpakant Township, Ko Tar Lin Maung and freelance journalist Ko Naung Yo. To secure their release, the Myanmar Journalists Association (IMJA) sent an open letter on October 23 and within a few days, the two journalists were released. It was also reported that the Independent Press Council Myanmar (IPCM) mediated efforts for their release, according to media sources.
In 2024, despite tensions arising between the media and revolutionary groups in ethnic regions, reciprocal meetings and discussions were successfully conducted to facilitate dialogue and coordination.
Finding
The military junta imposed the internet shutdown at least (82) townships in 2024.
Areas experiencing internet outages are also observed to be regions where the military junta and armed conflicts have intensified.
Almost every township that the military junta had lost control experienced internet shutdown.
VPN use was more strictly prohibited by the military regime.
It has been observed that in regions it controls, the military junta nevertheless keeps an eye on internet users' activity and takes appropriate action.
This monitoring extends not only to Facebook but also increasingly to TikTok usage.
Similar to the deterioration in internet freedom, Myanmar's press freedom status has also declined worse.
Recommendations
To diminish the internet shutdown imposed by the military junta and to protect the digital rights of our citizens, we would like to make the following request to the international community:
To Condemn and Penalize Internet Shutdowns
Diplomatic Action: Strongly condemn Myanmar's military junta for internet shutdowns and restrictions, highlighting their impact on human suffering.
Targeted Sanctions: Sanction companies supporting shutdowns or surveillance infrastructure.
Global Advocacy: Use platforms like the UN and ASEAN to pressure the junta to restore internet access in affected areas, particularly in conflict zones.
Support Digital Resilience and Secure Communication
Technology Distribution: Provide funding and resources to distribute secure communication tools, such as VPNs, encryption apps, and mesh network devices, to circumvent shutdowns and restrictions.
Capacity Building: Partner with local organizations to train communities on digital safety and secure online practices.
Emergency Connectivity: Explore satellite-based internet solutions for affected areas, ensuring communities can access critical information and report human rights abuses.
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