The coup, which started on February 1, 2021, has been ongoing for three and a half years. The non-violent protests that began at the start of the coup have evolved into an armed revolution due to the junta’s cruel oppression. The armed revolution, which began from nothing, has achieved significant victories over these three and a half years.
The junta has lost control over many regions in the ethnic states and has had to give up control of the central regions of the country. The seizure of Thandwe Airport by revolutionary forces is undeniable proof of the junta’s heavy losses in the conflict.
In a desperate attempt to cover up their significant losses, the junta is intensifying their digital oppression. In addition to their usual methods of shutting down the internet and mobile connections, they have even blocked virtual private networks (VPNs) nationwide. Pro-regime accounts are conducting surveillance and arresting individuals who express their opinions on social media.
This article describes the phenomenon of digital repression and the related incidents that occurred between May 2024 to July 2024.
Summary of Digital Oppression Issues in May 2024
(a) Shutting down mobile and internet connections
(b) Arrests limiting freedom of expression
(c) Attempts to enforce surveillance and monitoring of citizens
(d) Media freedom
(a) Shutting Down Mobile and Internet Connections
Frequent shutdowns of mobile and internet connections by the regime during the coup aim to deprive the people of access to information, suppress news from within the country, disrupt communication among pro-democracy movements, and gain a military upper hand in heavily contested conflict zones.
Mobile and internet connections were shut down in Pauk Township, Magway Division. The Mandalay Free Press (MFP) reported that schools and residences were destroyed by bombing from junta aircraft, despite there being no ongoing clashes during the mobile and internet shutdowns. The Dawei region also experienced mobile and internet shutdowns. Locals complained that these shutdowns led to fire hazards and an inability to contact ambulances.
Following escalating conflicts between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Military Council in Buthidaung, Maungdaw, and Thandwe, the regime imposed mobile and internet blackouts in Thandwe, along with electricity cutoffs. After the Masaw Bridge explosion on the Yangon-Mawlamyine Highway near Taungkalay Village, Bilin Township, Mon State, mobile and internet cutoffs occurred in some townships in Mon State, including Mawlamyine City. These cutoffs are the result of the junta’s actions and damage to communication cables near the bridges and buildings during clashes. Kachin State is also suffering from frequent loss of signal with Atom and Ooredoo mobile services.
The regime is imposing electricity cutoffs more frequently in some regions, in addition to mobile and internet shutdowns, to strengthen the communication blockade. On the evening of May 29, the regime cut off electricity in Waingmaw City, which is one river (Irrawaddy River) away from Myitkyina City. Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 321 in Waingmaw City and other junta outposts around Waingmaw were seized by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The regime is enforcing various forms of oppression on people living in conflict areas, where they are suffering significant losses.
The regime has imposed restrictions on VPN usage starting on May 30, 2024. The Thai government has cut off internet connections in the Shwe Kokko region, a Border Guard Forces (BGF)-controlled area known as Gambling City. Justice for Myanmar (JFM) stated that cybercrimes across Southeast Asia are being perpetrated by the BGF/KNA under the leadership of Saw Chit Thu.
Athan Organization reported that over 90 townships were cut off from mobile connections. The KeepItOn Organization also issued a report this month, stating that Myanmar had the second-highest number of internet cutoffs in 2023 among all countries in the world.
(b) Arrests Limiting Freedom of Expression
Surveillance and arrests for expressing opinions on social media are ongoing, in addition to mobile and internet cutoffs. The regime is using the 66D Telecommunications Law to carry out these arrests. They are also applying this law against entertainment broadcasts if they are deemed to contain content that is contrary to Myanmar’s traditions and culture. The Myanmar Motion Picture Organization informed its members on May 9 that broadcasting scenes considered against Myanmar culture will result in punishment under the Telecommunications Law. Actor Banyar Bhone Pyae and actress Shwe Su were arrested and charged under Section 33A of the Telecommunications Law at Pazundaung Police Station on May 15 for their roles in an MTV titled “A Chit Khan Kyi.” At least 16 individuals have been arrested for expressing their opinions on social media.
(c) Attempts to Enforce Surveillance and Monitoring of Citizens
In order to surveil and control all citizens’ actions, the regime is compelling people to register for UID cards. The Ministry of Immigration and Population (LaWaKa) announced that everyone living abroad is now required to register for UID numbers. UID card registration has become more frequent as the regime pressures people to show their UID cards during domestic and international travel. The Ministry of Immigration and Population (LaWaKa) has also warned that individuals using fake UID numbers will be punished according to the law. These actions demonstrate the regime’s desperate effort to implement the UID system and track people’s activities.
The regime is not only trying to track people’s travels but also to monitor and control currency flow and transactions. The junta has refused to acknowledge its incompetence in managing the nation’s economy, which has led to inflation and economic depression, instead blaming the currency exchange business. Consequently, the regime has been monitoring and arresting individuals involved in online transactions. The Central Bank of Myanmar announced on May 26 that 16 social media pages involved in currency exchange were charged. The Central Bank also stated that individuals using fake IDs on Facebook, Viber, and Telegram to obtain unfavourable currency exchange rates have contributed to currency instability. Additionally, the Central Bank announced that illegal exchanges of digital currencies, including USD, will be charged under laundering and other transaction laws. Since the coup, people have been monitored and restricted from using their own money freely.
(d) Media Freedom
A DMG reporter and staff were initially charged under the Telecommunications Law but were later charged under the Counter Terrorism Law. The Independent Press Council Myanmar (IPCM) reported that 52 journalists were arrested and 15 news outlets had their licenses revoked. Following some misunderstanding and minor conflicts between ethnic revolutionary organisations and journalists working in their regions, the National Unity Government (NUG) issued a Position Statement on Freedom of the Press and News Media, and the IPCM also issued an Ethical Reporting Statement. According to Reporters Without Borders’ 2024 Press Freedom Index, Myanmar ranks 171 out of 180 countries in terms of press freedom.
Summary of Digital Oppression Issues in June 2024
(a) Shutting down mobile and internet connections
(b) Arrests limiting freedom of expression
(c) VPN restrictions
(d) Additional noteworthy events in the digital domain during June 2024
(a) Shutting Down Mobile and Internet Connections
Under pressure from ongoing battles, the regime continues to enforce internet and mobile connection cutoffs. In some regions, it has also cut off electricity.
Locals in Thandwe City are suffering greatly due to the regime’s electricity cutoffs. Charging a mobile phone in that region costs 1,000 kyats. In Taungup City, where severe clashes between the Arakan Army (AA) and junta troops are ongoing, the regime has cut off mobile and internet connections and restricted movement into and out of the city.
Matupi, a city in Chin State, has been cut off from the internet since the 2021 coup, and mobile connections were recently disrupted after resistance forces infiltrated the city. Kyaukme City and Nawnghkio City have experienced poor mobile connections following clashes between the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and junta troops. It resulted in difficulties in mobile phone usage. Shwe Phee Myay News Agency reported that Northern Shan State has faced blackouts and mobile cutoffs after renewed clashes. These events indicate that the regime is accelerating communication breakdowns in heavily conflicted areas.
During the month, a notable event was the cutoff of mobile connections in Myawaddy Township that relied on Thailand’s cell towers. Hopin Electricity Supply Enterprise posted on its Facebook page that mobile connections broke down after an MPT tower on the road to Chipwi City was prohibited from refueling. The inability to refuel at cell towers has led to more frequent internet and mobile breakdowns. Kachin News Group reported that Puta-O City regained mobile and internet connections starting June 24.
(b) Arrests Limiting Freedom of Expression
Surveillance and arrests for expressing opinions on social media are ongoing. The regime refuses to acknowledge that the severe economic depression in the country is due to their incompetence in management. Instead, they blame social media.
The Central Bank of Myanmar has accused individuals of intentionally attacking the stability of the country’s currency and economy by using Facebook to spread fake news. As a result, the Central Bank suspended the Pay Accounts of 39 people involved in operating hundi businesses through social media.
The regime also charged some businessmen under Section 505A after they posted about salary increases for their employees. The regime deemed this action as an attempt to destabilize the country, contributing to inflation and a decrease in exchange value.
The Ministry of Information (MOI) stated on their Telegram channel that at least 37 civilians were arrested for expressing opinions on social media.
(c) VPN Restrictions
After the regime restricted social media usage following the coup, users had to rely on VPNs. Starting at the end of May 2024, further restrictions on VPNs were imposed, rendering many previously used VPNs unusable.
The regime’s use of advanced methods to restrict VPNs has made it difficult for people to access Facebook. Taking advantage of this situation, the regime has attempted to replace Facebook with their own social media platform, My Space. Reports indicate that Brigadier General Lu Mon led the VPN restriction operation with the assistance of Mascots Technologies & Telecommunication Company and Chinese technicians. Justice For Myanmar (JFM) has reported on the involvement of Chinese companies in the VPN restrictions.
While the regime is imposing VPN restrictions, junta troops are also checking people’s mobile phones and making arrests and blackmailing individuals if they find VPNs on their devices. These arrests and instances of blackmail have occurred in many cities across Myanmar, including Yangon, Mandalay, Bago, Pathein, Pyay, Lashio, and Taungtha.
The National Unity Government (NUG) stated that revolutionary forces are developing private VPN software and working to create independent internet networks in regions where the regime cannot exert control.
(d) Additional Noteworthy Events in the Digital Domain During June 2024
There were noteworthy events in the digital domain this month. The regime, facing economic difficulties due to inflation and high expenses, attempted to impose the use of digital currency as the main system. Additionally, the official website of the National League for Democracy (NLD) was altered to a gambling website. The regime also announced that the national census will begin on September 30, 2024.
Summary of Digital Oppression Issues in July 2024
(a) Shutting Down Mobile and Internet Connections
(b) Restrictions on Telecommunications and VPNs
(c) The Regime’s Attempts to Suppress Media
(d) Additional Noteworthy Events in the Digital Domain During June 2024
(a) Shutting Down Mobile and Internet Connections
Internet cutoffs during the month are a result of the regime’s actions, the destruction of internet infrastructure during clashes, and shifts in the political stances of neighbouring countries.
Mogok City, Pyin Oo Lwin Region, and Mandalay Division have experienced internet and mobile breakdowns following clashes between the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and junta troops. Myitkyina City, Kachin State, has also encountered internet and mobile breakdowns due to flooding. The regime cut off internet and mobile connections in Singu Township, Mandalay Division, after the People’s Defence Force (Mandalay) (MDY-PDF) attempted to seize the city and clashes ensued. Thabeikkyin City, a neighboring city to Mogok, Singu, and Htigyaing, where intense clashes are occurring, has also faced internet and mobile breakdowns imposed by the regime, with only Wi-Fi being available. Mogok City, Mandalay Division, has suffered a total shutdown of internet and mobile services following heavy clashes.
Following the Kokang Forces’ attack on Lashio City, Chinese mobile and internet connections used in Laukkai City were cut off. China’s use of power to negotiate and exert pressure in the Northern Shan State clashes has been evident since the first wave of the 1027 operation.
Thandwe City, Rakhine State, has encountered mobile breakdowns following the bombing that resulted in the destruction of cell towers amid ongoing heavy clashes. Across Rakhine State, the Arakan Army (AA) and junta troops are heavily clashing, leading to mobile and internet connection cutoffs throughout the state. During these communication breakdowns, regions near the Bangladesh border have had to use internet connections from Bangladesh. During the month, Bangladesh also faced political turmoil and imposed its own mobile and internet connection cutoffs. Some journalists have reported that this has affected certain regions in Rakhine State, making reporting more challenging. Due to the mobile and internet connection cutoffs, heavy military actions, and the reduced availability of cash, withdrawing money from the K-pay application incurs charges of up to 18% of the money being cashed out.
Puta-O City, which regained mobile and internet connectivity on the 24th of the previous month, has encountered cutoffs again. Momeik City and Lashio City in Northern Shan State have experienced mobile and internet cutoffs following heavy clashes, leading to difficulties in local communication, increased expenses, and refugees facing grave dangers due to the lack of information. Regions controlled by the TNLA in Northern Shan State, such as Namtu, Namhsan, and Namhkam, have suffered additional mobile and internet cutoffs. All of Kachin State also encountered mobile and internet cutoffs starting from July 21. The regime, using mobile and internet connections as a weapon, held a meeting to create an E-Government. Chin State, which had experienced internet cutoffs, regained both internet and electricity on July 26.
(b) Restrictions on Telecommunications and VPNs
In addition to internet cutoffs, the regime also tried to restrict the usage of the Signal app, an online communication platform. The restriction of Signal by the regime has made it even more difficult for people to use internet communications. The regime imposed restrictions on VPN usage on May 30. Since then, junta troops have been checking people’s mobile phones on the street for VPNs and engaging in blackmail. Pyusawhti members and gang members were observed checking phones for VPNs and blackmailing citizens in South Dagon, Yangon. This occurred without the involvement of official junta security forces, as pro-regime Pyusawhti and its gang members acted alone in threatening and blackmailing people. On July 17, junta security forces even entered residences in Set San Quarter, Kyimyindaing Township to check mobile phones for VPNs. These events indicate that the regime’s digital oppression is becoming more severe day by day. Pro-regime social media users also reported that the regime has recorded the personal details of 400 revolutionary supporters and has begun arresting them. The regime’s Ministry of Information (MOI) and Myanmar Newspaper Telegram reported that 23 people were arrested during the month for expressing opinions online.
(c) The Regime’s Attempts to Suppress Media
The regime has been imprisoning journalists and suppressing media outlets since the coup, forcing many to flee to other countries to continue reporting.
During the month, the regime’s Ministry of Information threatened foreign-based media outlets such as Mizzima, The Irrawaddy, Khit Thit, and Myanmar Now by stating that The Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Transport and Communications, and the Ministry of Immigration and Population are collaborating to take action against these media outlets.
(d) Additional noteworthy events in the digital domain during July 2024
The Central Bank of Myanmar’s restriction on cash withdrawals has caused significant trouble for businesses and individuals, leading to long lines at banks. The regime is attempting to contain inflation, caused by excessive cash printing, by enforcing a digital money system.
The regime is desperately attempting to hold the 2025 election as an escape route for their losses in Northern Shan State, Rakhine State, and central regions of Myanmar. Moreover, the junta leader Min Aung Hlaing has appointed himself as acting president.
The regime, struggling with the economy and a lack of foreign currency, has even ordered the arrest of online shops selling food, cosmetics, medicine, medical equipment, and various other products, labelling them as engaged in illegal trading.
EngageMedia is publishing English translations of the Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly produced by the Myanmar Internet Project. This post covers updates between May 2024 to July 2024 and highlights digital oppression incidents documented during that period. Read the original post in Burmese here, and learn more about EngageMedia’s broader work to support digital rights in Myanmar on EngageMedia.org/Myanmar.
Read the other editions of the report.
Recommended Citation Style -
Myanmar Internet Project (2024, August 10). Myanmar Digital Coup quarterly: May 2024 to July 2024. https://www.myanmarinternet.info/post/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-may-2024-to-july-2024
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