Telegram's Role in the Ongoing Violence in Rakhine State
Introduction
Since the 2021 military coup d’état and the period beforehand, Rakhine State has faced intense conflict fueled by a genocidal campaign against the Rohingya - an ethnic minority within the State. The Burmese junta also continues to oppress other ethnic groups across the country, but due to the Rohingya genocide, Rakhine State has come to the forefront of international attention and interest.
In Burma, nationalists and military supporters have exploited popular social media platforms such as Facebook and YouTube to foster tension and discrimination across ethnic, religious, political, and social lines, and have contributed to the ongoing violence in Rakhine State.
However, due to the junta’s imposed bans and restrictions on Facebook after the 2021 coup, the majority of the public migrated to the platform “Telegram,” and currently continue to simultaneously engage with both.
Facebook’s new censorship policies on content related to the Rohingya and other issues concerning Rakhine State have also restricted nationalists and military supporters from continuing to push harmful narratives on this platform. They have instead shifted to rely on another application - Telegram - as their primary platform to launch propaganda campaigns, spread disinformation and fake news intended to construe the facts, and overall weaponize the use of information online. They have constructed and established a digital network of different profiles on various social media platforms for immediate and mass distribution of their content to society. Utilizing this network, the harmful narratives launched on Telegram are then scattered across other platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok.
This report details the creation and distribution of Telegram content that seeks to escalate tensions and incite violence in Rakhine State, and identifies the users behind these efforts. It explores the construction of various narratives, the propagation of fake news and conspiracies, and includes a collection of key words and language examples used in these materials.
Key Words
Terms used by nationalists and military supporters to address different communities often promote ethnic and religious discrimination, featuring slurs, other derogatory terms, and comparisons of certain ethnic groups to wild animals.
They avoid the use of “Rohingya,” and instead employ key words historically found within genocidal propaganda that aim to erase the group’s existence in history.
For example, the Rohingya are often referred to as “Bengali (‘ဘင်္ဂါလီများ)” and “လူမျိုးလိမ်အမည် (roughly translated to - ‘the fake ethnic name group’)” to push the narrative that they are from Bangladesh and deny them of their heritage in Burma. Derogatory terms such as “ဘင်များ” are also employed. In an effort to escape censorship policies, new terms were also created that could escape the monitoring algorithms of social media platforms, such as “Kmklများ” and “Pင်ပြဲ အောင်.”
In addition, news of Rakhine towns and villages being attacked by airstrikes and heavy weaponry are referenced as the Rakhine people’s “blood debts” finally being paid off, suggesting they deserved the violence.
Attached is a list of the most popular keywords utilized in posts regarding the Rohingya and Rakhine State:
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Narrative Style
Hateful content against the Rohingya and communities in Rakhine State typically avoids direct, aggressive language that could be easily flagged on social media, such as “Let’s kill them all and make them extinct.” Instead, users embed these messages into more subtle narratives.
These posts use catchy phrases and engaging stories to attract readers and influence their views. They often depict cases of Rohingya and Rakhine people abusing women and other vulnerable groups, using emojis and graphic photos to amplify the impact.
Attached are examples of popular narratives regarding the Rohingya and Rakhine State:
Mis/ dis Information
Fake news, mis/dis-information, and conspiracies were all regularly distributed, intending to fuel ethnic and religious hatred and divides.
Attached are examples of fake news stories that were spread:
Language
“Bamar” : The Bamar language, which originates from the Bamar ethnic group, is the official language of Myanmar. However, other ethnic groups and minorities use their own languages in daily life. The Myanmar government officially recognizes 135 ethnic groups, with the eight major ones being: 1) Bamar, 2) Kachin, 3) Karenni (also known as Kayah), 4) Karen (also known as Kayin), 5) Chin, 6) Mon, 7) Rakhine, and 8) Shan.
Each major ethnic group speaks a different language, and within these groups, smaller ethnic minorities speak distinct, indigenous languages. Other languages, including Bengali and Hindustani dialects, are also present in Myanmar.
Nonetheless, the Bamar language is commonly used by other ethnic groups and minorities, and very few groups in Myanmar do not speak it.
As a result, most propaganda related to the Rohingya and Rakhine State is written in Bamar. Nationalists and military supporters accuse ethnic groups of finding fault with the Bamar language, and claim that they believe its usage will destroy Myanmar.
The Main Actors of Hatespeech and Propaganda Network
Arakan Htar Ney
Arakan Htar Ney was created on December 9, 2023. This channel was part of Ko Thet’s network and focused on propaganda in Rakhine State. It incited conflict in Rakhine State, praising the killing, arresting, and torturing by the Myanmar military, and called for bombings and airstrikes. As of April 2024, the channel is inaccessible.
Arakan Htar Ney collaborates with a network of 23 military-proxy channels led by Ko Thet and promotes 13 other military-proxy channels within their network.
Ba Nyunt (aka Bo Kyaw)
Ba Nyunt, also known as Bo Kyaw, is a pro-military actor with close ties to Han Nyein Oo and Kyaw Swar, sharing admin access to various Telegram channels with them. He has played a key role in the ongoing campaign of terror against pro-democracy activists, responsible for widespread doxxing and gender-based harassment, including the repeated sharing of non-consensual sexual imagery. He operates 17 Telegram accounts under the names Ba Nyunt and Bo Kyaw.
Ba Nyunt emerged as a significant bad actor following the coup on July 8, 2021. Initially, he mostly re-shared content from senior channels such as Myanmar National Post, Han Nyein Oo, and Kyaw Swar. His active Telegram account was opened in March 2023.
He collaborates with 55 other military-proxy Telegram channels and promotes three additional military-proxy channels, including two partisan media outlets.
Combat News
The Burmese name "တိုက်ပွဲစုံသတင်း" translates to Combat News, a military proxy channel that opened on July 7, 2023. This channel is part of Ko Thet’s network and has been promoted by Ko Thet’s channel at least 300 times. Another related account, using the hashtag (#), is Khin Nyo Chaw(ခင်ညိုချော), which primarily shares content from "Fifty Two News". Combat News distributes battle news content from the opposing side and also shares content from Kyaw Swar and Min Chit Oo. Initially, Combat News was promoted by 47 military-proxy channels led by Ko Thet. It promotes other news channels, including Fifty Two News.
Han Nyein Oo
Han Nyein Oo, also known as Soe Naing or Ka Ka Han, was a notorious celebrity gossip figure before the coup. He was associated with various clickbait publications and YouTube channels, reportedly monetizing through these ventures. Since the coup, he has been actively involved in targeted attacks on anti-coup activists, including campaigns of sexual harassment and mass doxxing. According to some sources, even the police and troops of the State Administration Council (SAC) are required to inform Han Nyein Oo immediately upon arresting individuals.
After the coup, Han Nyein Oo has built audiences on Telegram, sometimes sharing illegal pornographic content. We have identified 42 Telegram accounts associated with Han Nyein Oo, including 5 active channels and 2 active groups.
He collaborates with 59 other military-proxy Telegram channels and promotes 28 additional military-proxy channels, including those associated with Hmine Wai and Kyaw Swar.
Hmine Wai
The account named "မှိုင်းဝေ" (Hmine Wai) was opened on December 2, 2021, and shares content from figures such as Phoe Si (တပ်ကြပ်ကြီးဖိုးစီ), Ko Thet, Han Nyein Oo, Kyaw Swar, Ba Nyunt, among others. Another account associated with Hmine Wai is "ကပ္ပတိန် မှိုင်းဝေ," which was opened on June 16, 2023. According to some of Hmine Wai’s posts, he is based in the military headquarters in Nay Pyi Taw. Ko Thet has been promoting Hmine Wai since the account's inception.
On Telegram, Hmine Wai collaborates with 136 military-proxy channels and promotes 218 military-proxy channels. His network significantly overlaps with Ko Thet's.
Ko Chit (MDY)
Ko Chit (MDY) is a pro-military Telegram channel opened on June 28, 2021. This account is affiliated with Ko Thet’s network and disseminates content for military propaganda while undermining pro-democracy movements. Most of Ko Chit's content focuses on military movement information, particularly in the Mandalay region. Evidence suggests he is involved with the MDY image channel, further implicating his role.
On Telegram, Ko Chit (MDY) collaborates with 67 military-proxy channels and promotes 56 others. His network overlaps significantly with Ko Thet, Hmine Wai, Kyaw Swar, and others.
Ko Thet
Ko Thet presents himself as a journalist, but he is actually a lieutenant commander, as revealed in a video published on Han Nyein Oo’s Telegram channel where Ko Thet is seen wearing a military uniform. The badge and logo on his uniform indicate his affiliation with the 44th Light Infantry Division of the Myanmar Military, based in Thaton, Mon State. He operates 10 Telegram accounts, with his active account opened in October 2021.
Since the coup, Ko Thet has been actively involved in military propaganda and leads a network of accounts across multiple social media platforms. On Telegram, he collaborates with 166 military-proxy channels and promotes 304 military-proxy channels, including those associated with prominent nationalist activist Naung Taw Lay.
Kyaw Swar
Kyaw Swar is the chief editor of Positive Angle News (PAN), founded in January 2023. He was originally part of the Southeastern Command and also served as a digital lobbyist for the USDP during the 2020 elections. Since the coup, he has been actively connected with Han Nyein Oo and Thazin Oo under the Tri Star umbrella, coordinating doxxing campaigns. He operates 12 Telegram accounts, with his active account opened in October 2023. The Positive Angle News (PAN) Telegram account was also opened in January 2023.
Kyaw Swar’s update channel, established on October 20, 2023, now has 165,000 followers. He actively collaborates with 85 other military-proxy Telegram channels, including Ko Thet, and promotes the Min Chit Oo channels, a prominent military lobbyist focused on propaganda in Rakhine State.
May Yu Htar Nay
May Yu Htar Nay is a covert media channel that opened on June 23, 2022, and is led by Ko Thet’s team. This channel posts and shares Rakhine news from the military, serving as military propaganda. It particularly promotes Min Chit Oo and other purported Rakhine covert Rakhine media outlets including Western 24 News, Doror Waddy Media, Paltwa Daily News, ရခိုင်နေ့စဥ်, ယနေ့ရခိုင်ပြည်ဖြစ်ရပ်မှန်များ, သံတွဲမြို့လူထုအသံ, Voice of Muslim, and Arakan Htar Ney. Our observations indicate that May Yu Htar Nay plays a key role in the military propaganda network targeting Rakhine State.
On Telegram, May Yu Htar Nay collaborates with 55 military-proxy channels and promotes 95 military-proxy channels within Ko Thet’s network.
Min Chit Oo
Min Chit Oo is a pro-military Telegram channel that opened on June 27, 2021. He is part of a propaganda network alongside Ko Thet, Kyaw Swar, Ba Nyunt, and Han Nyein Oo. Min Chit Oo(2) serves as the backup channel and was opened on February 18, 2023. This account primarily targets Rakhine State and leads the military narrative in that region. It is involved in mass doxxing, collecting intelligence on the Arakan Army's movements, inciting violence, and conducting disinformation campaigns.
Min Chit Oo has been promoted by Ko Thet and May Yu Htar Nay’s network. On Telegram, Min Chit Oo collaborates with 89 military-proxy channels and promotes content related to ရခိုင်နေ့စဥ်.
Min Kan Si aka လက်ဝဲသုန္ဒရအမတ်ကြီး
The Burmese name "လက်ဝဲသုန္ဒရအမတ်ကြီး" is an account of Min Kan Si, opened on October 30, 2023. This channel is part of the Snow Queen network. It geographically targets Mon State and is involved in military intelligence, collecting information on the movements of PDF (People's Defense Forces) and EAOs (Ethnic Armed Organizations), and engaging in counter-propaganda. Min Kan Si, also known as "လက်ဝဲသုန္ဒရအမတ်ကြီး," incites violence against civilians in conflict areas. This account primarily shares content from Snow Queen and Min Din and collaborates with 6 military propaganda channels, promoting 12 military propaganda channels.
Naung Taw Lay (aka Naing Win Tun)
Naung Taw Lay, also known as Naing Win Tun, is the chief editor of Myanmar National Post (MNP), the secretary of the Myanmar National Network, and a nationalist activist. Before the coup, he was actively involved in nationalist movements and has strong connections with Win Ko Ko Latt, Aye Lay, Kyaw Soe Oo, Win Maw (Shwe Than Zin), and the Patriotic Association of Myanmar (Ma Ba Tha). Naung Taw Lay founded MNP with other associates from the Myanmar National Network and serves as Editor in Chief.
Naung Taw Lay started using Telegram in December 2021. Initially, he collaborated with the USDP digital campaign channel called Taung Paw Tar (တောင်ပေါ်သား). After June 2023, Ko Thet’s network began promoting Naung Taw Lay's channel. Members of Ko Thet’s network, such as Ko Thet, Hmine Wai, and Lin Nay, shared Naung Taw Lay’s content on their channels and encouraged their audiences to join his channel.
Naung Taw Lay has three Telegram accounts, including personal and channel accounts. His active Telegram account was opened in December 2021. On this account, he identifies himself as a national journalist. The same posts are uploaded on both his personal and channel accounts on Telegram. He collaborates with 42 USDP and military-backed channels and promotes 12 channels, including his partisan media outlet, MNP.
People Media
People Media is a pro-military media outlet founded by Kyaw Soe Oo, its chief editor, in 2019. The People Media Telegram channel was launched in February 2022 and is primarily used as a platform for their media content. Kyaw Soe Oo hosts a daily news review talk show on the People Media Telegram channel every night.
People Media collaborates with 91 other military-proxy Telegram channels, including Ko Thet, and promotes six additional military-proxy channels, including MRTV.
Phoe Si
The Burmese name "တပ်ကြပ်ကြီးဖိုးစည်" is the account of Phoe Si, which was opened on September 15, 2021. Other accounts associated with Phoe Si include "မောင်ဖိုးစည်" (opened on August 27, 2021), "တပ်ကြပ်ကြီး ဖိုးစီ" (opened on March 10, 2022), and "ဖိုးစည်" (opened on February 27, 2023). The name "တပ်ကြပ်ကြီး ဖိုးစည်" means Sergeant Phoe Si and is derived from a famous military propaganda movie character played by Kyaw Hein. As a result, the account uses the Burmese film star Kyaw Hein’s photo as its Telegram profile picture.
Phoe Si is involved in collecting military intelligence information on the movements of PDF (People's Defense Forces) and EAOs (Ethnic Armed Organizations), and engaging in counter-propaganda. Phoe Si primarily shares content from military-owned media channels, such as MWD News (opened on March 31, 2021) and the Commander-in-Chief Office of Defense Services Telegram channel, CNICDS Myanmar (opened on April 15, 2021).
On Telegram, Phoe Si collaborates with 28 military-proxy channels and promotes 7 military-proxy channels, including CINCDS Myanmar, Myawady Media, and his own backup channels.
Snow Queen
Snow Queen is a covert account claiming to be a news channel, which opened on April 9, 2023. In a short time, the network of Ye Yint Htet, Linn Nay, Ba Nyunt, and City Hunter channel promoted Snow Queen’s content, helping her amass 58K followers. Snow Queen is involved in mass doxxing, intelligence gathering, inciting violence, and counter-propaganda online.
Snow Queen closely collaborates with 66 channels, including Ye Yint Htet and Linn Nay, and promotes 144 channels, including Ba Nyunt and Ye Yint Htet.
Thazin Oo
Thazin Oo is the presenter of Thuriya Nay Wun and a former presenter of MHT News. She currently hosts TV shows on the MWD channel with Moe Hein on a weekly basis. Additionally, she campaigned for the USDP in the 2020 elections. Thazin Oo manages several Telegram channels, one of which has been previously banned by Telegram for repeated violations. Since the coup, she has been actively involved in targeted attacks on anti-coup activists, including campaigns of mass doxxing. Her active Telegram account was opened in March 2022.
Thazin Oo collaborates with 90 other military-proxy Telegram channels, including Ko Thet, and promotes 166 additional military-proxy channels, such as Ko Thet, Hmine Wai, and others.
Ye Yint Htet
Ye Yint Htet (#yyh) is the name of a pro-military Telegram channel that opened on June 30, 2021. This channel is part of the network involving Snow Queen and Ba Nyunt. Ye Yint Htet is involved in mass doxxing, intelligence gathering, inciting violence, and counter-propaganda online.
Ye Yint Htet closely collaborates with 55 channels, including Snow Queen and Linn Nay, and promotes 342 channels, including Snow Queen and Ba Nyunt.
Coordinated Behavior
During our research, we observed significant overlap within the network of military proxy channels. Key actors such as Ko Thet, Hmine Wai, Thazin Oo, Kyaw Swar, Han Nyein Oo, and Snow Queen are central to the propaganda network on Telegram. These actors and their teams are also behind covert media channels, targeting different geographic regions and ethnic groups.
One of their strategies to gain more audience is cross-posting channel URLs and asking their existing audience to join other channels. They also share content from less popular actors to increase their visibility. There are many overlapping admins within this network.
On Telegram, military actors use the same strategies for shaping narratives, mass doxxing, intelligence gathering, and inciting violence.
Conclusion
The analysis of the military propaganda network on Telegram in Myanmar reveals a highly coordinated and pervasive effort to influence public opinion, suppress dissent, and reinforce the military’s narrative. Key actors such as Ko Thet, Hmine Wai, Thazin Oo, Kyaw Swar, Han Nyein Oo, and Snow Queen play central roles in this network, using overlapping administrative control and cross-promotion strategies to expand their reach and amplify their messages.
This network’s tactics include mass doxxing, intelligence gathering, inciting violence, and disseminating disinformation, particularly targeting different geographic regions and ethnic groups to create division and unrest. The extensive collaboration and promotion among these channels not only enhance their propaganda efforts but also obscure the origins of their content, making it difficult for the public to identify reliable information sources.
These actors are using Telegram not just for sharing their content but also as a platform to drive traffic to their new accounts on Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, and Twitter, where Meta has actively banned them. Consequently, Telegram has become their audience bank for other social media platforms.
The implications of this coordinated propaganda network are profound, contributing to an environment of fear, misinformation, and polarized public opinion. It undermines democratic processes and threatens the safety and freedoms of individuals opposing the military regime.
To counter these efforts, it is crucial to sanction the main actors and investigate their networks. Social media platforms such as Meta, YouTube, Twitter, and TikTok need to ban links associated with the Telegram propaganda network. Additionally, civil society organizations and the international community must advocate for platform accountability and work with Telegram to address these issues.
Recommended Citation Style -
Myanmar Internet Project (2024, July 26). Fueling genocide. https://www.myanmarinternet.info/post/fueling-genocide
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