Social Media’s Role in Igniting and Escalating On-the-Ground Violence
A Study of Propagandists on Social Media After Operation 1027
Background Information
On July 25, 2024, the second wave of Operation 1027 began in Northern Shan State, impacting Naungcho, Kyaukme, Thibaw, Lashio, and surrounding areas. Conflict escalated notably in Lashio within the first month, resulting in numerous civilian casualties. On July 28, 2024, the Shan Herald Agency for News reported that while the Kokang Armed Forces had claimed control over Lashio, key military installations including the Lashio Military Headquarters, AT Loading Barracks, No.(6007) Tank Battalion, No.(7) Advanced Communication Corps, Electrical and Engineering Corps, No.(346) Artillery, No.(626) Support Corps, and the Lashio Air Force Base remained intact, suggesting further potential for intensified conflict. Concurrently, BBC (Burmese) reported that the Wa, United Wa State Army had entered the city, claiming their presence was for mediation and protection of internal assets.
In the latest wave of Operation 1027, a new campaign targeted the Mandalay Region, focusing on Mogok, Medaya, and Sinku towns. As of July 24, BBC (Burmese) reported that the Mandalay PDF and allied resistance groups had captured 28 military camps in Sinku, while the TNLA had taken control of Mogok. Additionally, the “Shan-Man Operation” encircled a 100-mile radius between Mogok and Madaya, with junta forces attempting to regain control. BBC (Burmese) indicated that under these conditions, the conflict was likely to spread to Mandalay.
Against this backdrop, pro-junta lobbyists and nationalists have increasingly questioned the junta’s operational, combat, and leadership capabilities, sparking public debate and scrutiny online. These groups have voiced a strong desire for the military to regain control, using social media to promote content urging more aggressive military actions, including widespread attacks with arms and airstrikes.
This study explores how social media platforms are used to disseminate such content and examines the strategies employed to circumvent community guidelines on harmful content, enabling the successful promotion of these violent and aggressive online campaigns.
Call for Action Cases: Direct Incitement of Violence
Pro-military Nationalists and Military Propagandists and
Their Online Campaigns to Incite Violence on the Ground
Conflict on the ground intensified as the Three Brotherhood Alliance and allied resistance forces pressed their offensive operations across Shan State. Pro-military nationalists and news agencies, key proponents of junta propaganda, began criticizing the military's perceived leniency in response to the escalating violence. They urged the military to employ all available resources and retaliate with full force. Using their propaganda platforms on various social media applications, they rallied public support for these aggressive measures, effectively mobilizing civilian backing for the military's actions.
Key pro-military figures and news agencies, including Ko Thet, Hmine Wai, Kyaw Swar, Thazin Oo, Ma Pu Tu, Kyaw Soe Oo, Kyaw Myo Min, Naung Taw Lay, Pauk Ko Taw as known as Nationalist Monk, and Zaw Bhone Hein, used their online platforms to call for targeted airstrikes, bombings, and shelling of areas occupied by resistance forces.
They also urged the military to boost morale among front-line soldiers and to arrest those opposing the junta. They monitored social media for anti-junta sentiments and reported individuals and groups expressing such views to the authorities.
Military bombardments and attacks were widely celebrated on social media, particularly on Telegram and TikTok. Pro-military nationalists favored TikTok for spreading celebratory messages, while military propagandists predominantly used Telegram.
Call for Action Cases by Nationalists
Date | Actor | Post Link | Post Description | Conflict Are | Social Media Platform |
29/6/24 | Kyaw Soe Oo | If the Tatmadaw has the strength, they should show it off. To kill more people, they should attack them with three helicopters instead of just one.” | Lashio | Telegram | |
30/6/24 | Paukko Taw | There are at least 500-600 Palaung soldiers stationed in the southwest of the “Aba” factory. When are you [the junta] going to do something [about it] with the 500-1000 pound bombs you have? | Medaya | TikTok | |
1/7/24 | Pauk Ko Taw | Rebuild the monastery that’s there later. We need 2-3 jets to airstrike the area like in Kyaukme. | Naung Cho | TikTok | |
3/7/24 | Ma Pu TU | As a civilian I request the Tatmadaw to completely eradicate the Three Monkeys (referring to the Three Brotherhood Alliance). I support and encourage your attacks. | Lashio | TikTok | |
4/7/24 | Pauk Ko Taw | The military needs send more support to make an impact in the war. More planes are needed to attack effectively. | Medaya | TikTok | |
4/7/24 | Kyaw Soe Oo | All that needs to be left standing is the land. We can always rebuild the structures. | Sinku | Telegram | |
10/7/24 | Zaw Bhone Hein | The entire town of Naung Cho should be bombed. All that needs to be left standing is the land. | Naung Cho | TikTok | |
15/7/24 | Ma Pu Tu (Mahar Thwe) | They are foreigners claiming to be an ethnic group in Myanmar. I don’t want to stop shooting at them, I want to eradicate them from the root. I request the Tatmadaw to keep shooting them and eradicate them from the root. | Lashio | TikTok | |
15/7/24 | Zaw Bhone Hein | Go bomb them, it’s not difficult. Use all of the nation’s resources in arms and manpower to attack them, and grind them to dust. That way they’ll know the power of the Bamar. | Lashio | TikTok | |
19/7/24 | Zaw Bhone Hein | Fight the war properly. We will be responsible for providing news from the ground. | Lashio | TikTok | |
23/7/24 | Zaw Bhone Hein | You just need 3 hydrogen bombs for the Northeast Regional Command(ရမခ). One hydrogen bomb costs 3 million USD. This war is over if you just use 3 of these bombs. | Lashio | TikTok | |
24/7/24 | Zaw Bhone Hein | We must bomb all the towns that the terrorists (referring to resistance force) are in with fire bombs and cluster bombs. | Lashio | TikTok |
Call for Action Cases by Military Propagandists
Date | Actor | Post Link | Post Description | Conflict Area | Social Media Platform |
29/6/24 | Kyaw Swar | Right now you [the junta] have full permission to freely bomb Laukkai, Hsenwi, and northern Shan cities. | Laukkai | Telegram | |
29/6/24 | Kyaw Swar | If the news is true that MNDAA has entered Thibaw, Laukkai needs to be bombed. | Laukkai | Telegram | |
29/6/24 | Kyaw Swar | The locals in Mogok support the resistance. All that needs to be left standing is the land. We don’t need the people or the building structures, survivors are not necessary. | Mogok | Telegram | |
29/6/24 | Ko Thet | What bullshit is the Wa group pulling? Bomb them all. All that needs to be left standing is the land. | Pansan | Telegram | |
30/6/24 | Kyaw Swar | Many MNDAA soldiers are currently receiving medical treatment at Kunlong hospital. There are no civilians. This is the best time to bomb them and the area. | Lashio | Telegram | |
3/7/24 | Ko Thet | There are no more civilians in Thanlwin, only the yellow skinned imperialists who invaded it. Attack them and turn them to dust. | Lashio | Telegram | |
3/7/24 | Kyaw Swar | Starting with Laukkai, all the towns that are under the control of the terrorists (referring to resistance forces) need to be bombed in groups. | Laukkai | Telegram | |
3/7/24 | Thazin Oo | If you want to be able to hold the enemy back in the Northeast Regional Command, you need to bomb 3 out of the 6 areas we know they are located in on the map with 1000 pound bombs. | Lashio | Telegram | |
3/7/24 | Thazin Oo | [Commenting on the increased attacks by the Burmese junta] Wow, I actually believe now that Burmese authorities are listening to us and the news on Thazin Oo’s Telegram channel | Lashio | Telegram | |
4/7/24 | Hmine Wa | There are no civilians in Than Lwin Village, only terrorist groups (referring to resistance forces) and their leaders are there. Please bomb Than Lwin Village. | Lashio | Telegram | |
4/7/24 | Hmine Wai | We need support from the air to shoot the oil station. Feel free to bomb all the surrounding areas. | Medaya | Telegram | |
4/7/24 | Hmine Wai | Starting with Laukkai, you need to bomb all of the towns that have been captured by terrorists (referring to resistance forces). | Laukkai | Telegram | |
4/7/24 | Hmine Wa | Nan Paung was just bombed with air support. Unsure if they have or have not bombed ThanLwin Village yet. | Lashio | Telegram | |
4/7/24 | Hmine Wai | Nan Paung was hit by an airstrike. Keep launching more airstrikes. | Lashio | Telegram |
Legitimizing the Need for Violence
Vote for Bomb
Nationalist and military propagandists, including prominent figures like Nar Yee Moe and Ko Thet, launched online campaigns advocating for military intervention in Northern Shan State, particularly through bombardments. They portrayed the resistance forces’ capture of Lashio and Lakkai as a critical geopolitical issue, emphasizing the shared border with China and the risk of imperial invasion if control was not swiftly regained. On their Telegram channels, they conducted opinion polls asking their audience about potential next steps, including bombing entire cities. These polls were designed not only to gauge support among military sympathizers but also to rally backing for the junta’s aggressive actions. The positive feedback from these polls is believed to have influenced the junta’s decision to proceed with intense airstrikes on Lashio, Lokkai, and other resistance-controlled areas.
Most polls focused on gathering opinions about conducting airstrikes on towns and taking action against those opposing the military.
"Opinion poll on military action to be taken"
Nar Yee Moe
Regarding the Northern Alliance forces
Bomb their relevant headquarters
Invite them to Naypyitaw for a peace talk to end the fighting
Invite China to broker a peace agreement to end the fighting
"Opinion poll on whether to kill pro-revolution supporters"
View of Sue
To eliminate the Burmese maggot traitors that encouraged the rebels [(referring to resistance groups)] to capture towns (to those who say Yes, start saving data and comments of those who supported them now. Screen recordings are better than just screenshots)
Yes, do it.
No, don’t do it.
"Opinion poll on civilian attitudes towards bombardment [(by the junta)]"
Nar Yee Moe
Next steps after China successfully engaged MNDAA in a 5 day ceasefire
Keep bombing Laukkai
Engage in a ceasefire like MNDAA
Wait for China’s conflict mediation procedures
"Opinion poll on civilian attitudes towards bombardment [(by the junta)]"
Nar Yee Moe
[To keep] our dignity, there are only 2 options
Bomb Lashio
Bomb Nansan and Laukkai until everything is flattened to the ground
Main Actors Involved
Nationalists
Naung Taw Lay’s social media accounts: Telegram - https://shorturl.at/lrJAb, https://shorturl.at/jqgi8, TikTok - https://shorturl.at/f0ciO | Naung Taw Lay Naung Taw Lay currently utilizes 13 social media accounts - including 2 Telegram channels, and 1 TikTok account - for both personal and media use for his established news agency, Myanmar National Post (MNP). Although he also used Facebook and YouTube, his accounts were removed from these platforms due to continuous violations of their Community Guidelines and/or Terms of Conditions. Currently, he does not have any active YouTube and Facebook accounts under his name nor his news agency MNP. Naung Taw Lay’s most active Telegram channel was opened in December 2021, and his TikTok account was created in March 2021. His openly states that he is a nationalist journalist in his channels, and often posts the same content on both his personal and media accounts simultaneously. On Telegram, he collaborates with 42 military channels, and utilizes 12 of his own MNP media accounts to effectively distribute military content and war propaganda. |
Ma Pu Tu’s social media accounts: Telegram - https://shorturl.at/XO0YN , https://shorturl.at/Btrv3 TikTok - https://shorturl.at/nnAjl Facebook - https://shorturl.at/lYbVo , https://shorturl.at/CtP9P , https://www.facebook.com/100056770241093 | Ma Pu Tu (Ma Har Thway) Ma Pu Tu (Ma Har Thway) is a prominent nationalist residing in Yangon. She has ties to Ashin Thuseikta and nationalist journalist, Naung Taw Lay. After gaining popularity on TikTok, she began working with Naung Taw Lay’s media outlet - Myanmar National Post (MNP). She would appear on MNP’s daily television broadcast where they would fact-check news and other country updates. Ma Pu Tu is known for coordinating campaigns to “root out” military opposition members mainly on TikTok and Telegram, though this content is also shared to Facebook later. |
 Pauk Ko Taw’s social media accounts: Telegram - https://t.me/PaukSayartaw TikTok - https://www.tiktok.com/@paukkotaw865 YouTube - https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCPabpIKBgjAj55E-4shmnDw | Pauk Ko Taw Pauk Ko Taw is a prominent nationalist and a member of the notorious MaBaTha (AKA Patriotic Association of Myanmar) known for inciting religious violence in Myanmar. After the 2021 coup, Pauk Ko Taw became involved in distributing military propaganda, and gained notoriety specifically for his efforts to fundraise and send food and money to junta soldiers. He also utilizes his MaBaTha network to gather information on pro-revolution supporters and shares this on his social media accounts to inform relevant military officials to take action accordingly. Pauk Ko Taw utilizes 3 social media accounts, including one on Telegram and one on TikTok. While he has used Facebook in the past, he does not currently have an active account as the platform removed him for frequent violations of Community Guidelines and/or Terms of Conditions. |
 Kyaw Soe Oo’s social media accounts: Telegram - https://t.me/kyawsoeoo1990 , https://t.me/PMmyanmarnewgroup , https://t.me/peoplemedianews,TikTok - https://www.tiktok.com/@kyawsoeoo462, https://www.tiktok.com/@people.media1, https://www.tiktok.com/@peoplemediamyanmar02, https://www.tiktok.com/@kyaw.soe.oo.peoplemedia, https://www.tiktok.com/@kyawsoeoo4203, https://www.tiktok.com/@kyawsoeoo462, https://www.tiktok.com/@people.media.myan, https://www.tiktok.com/@peoplemedia.2 , https://www.tiktok.com/@kyaw.soe.oo.peopl | Kyaw Soe Oo Kyaw Soe Oo is the Editor-in-Chief of People Media, a news agency established in 2019. He broadcasts a daily news review television program mainly through People Media’s established Telegram channel, rather than his personal one(s). After gradually attending SAC’s press conferences, he later began to primarily focus on reporting SAC news in his press. People Media, managed by Kyaw Soe Oo, collaborates with 91 pro-junta Telegram channels that create and distribute military-biased propaganda, including notorious military-affiliate Ko Thet. He is also connected to 6 pro-junta news channels on Telegram that work to promote this propaganda, including MRTV, a national broadcast program currently controlled by the junta. Kyaw Soe Oo utilizes 12 social media accounts, including 3 on Telegram and 9 on TikTok. Although he also used Facebook and YouTube, his accounts were removed from these platforms due to continuous violations of their Community Guidelines and/or Terms of Conditions. Currently, he still does not have any active Facebook or YouTube accounts. |
 Zaw Bhone Hein’s social media accounts: Telegram - https://t.me/zawbhonehein TikTok - https://www.tiktok.com/@note12r558, https://www.tiktok.com/@zawbhonehein.offical.acc YouTube - https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCxEXx0WiwlvXB30LGXKH8zA, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC7QP_BvLRfqJtYEZBj_9ueg | Zaw Bhone Hein Zaw Bhone Hein is a former soldier, and a prominent military lobbyist. He first became well known on TikTok after the 2021 coup, but later began to utilize Facebook and YouTube for his livestreams. He mainly relies on his social media accounts to rally public support for the military, and fundraise for cash, food and medical provisions for junta soldiers. Starting in 2022, he began to gather information on pro-revolution supporters, sharing it on his social media accounts to inform relevant military officials to take action accordingly. He utilizes 5 social media accounts, including 1 on Telegram, 2 on TikTok, and 1 on YouTube. Although he used Facebook in the past, his accounts were removed from the platform due to continuous violations of their Community Guidelines and/or Terms of Conditions. Currently, he still does not have any active Facebook accounts. |
Military Propagandists
 Ko Thet’s Social Media Accounts/Channels: Telegram - https://t.me/criminalcasebykothet , https://t.me/kothetjournalist, https://t.me/captainkothet, https://t.me/kothetjournalist007 TikTok - https://www.tiktok.com/@kothet0070007, https://www.tiktok.com/@kothet99999, YouTube - https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCDF3svmxxUMAPFILhwFZkgA | Ko Thet Ko Thet calls himself a writer and a journalist. However, in a video posted by Han Nyein Oo on Telegram, Ko Thet is seen in a military uniform, and it has now been confirmed that he is an army officer with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. The badge on the arm of his military uniform indicates that he is stationed in Mon State, Kyaitha Township, at the Southeast Regional Military Headquarters of the No.(44) Infantry Division. He currently manages 10 Telegram channels, with his most active one created in October 2021. Since the 2021 coup, Ko Thet has led the military’s propaganda campaigns on various social media campaigns. On Telegram, he collaborates with 166 military channels to launch these campaigns, and then relies on a network of another 304 channels that are solely responsible for further distributing propaganda content. Naung Taw Lay, a prominent nationalist in Myanmar, has been found to be involved in these processes. He utilizes 7 social media channels, including 4 on Telegram, 2 on TikTok, and 1 on YouTube. Although he used Facebook in the past, his accounts were removed from the platform due to continuous violations of their Community Guidelines and/or Terms of Conditions. Currently, he still does not have any active Facebook accounts. |
 Hmine Wai’s social media accounts/channels: Telegram - https://t.me/hminewai , https://t.me/hminewai6744 TikTok - https://www.tiktok.com/@hminewai200 , https://www.tiktok.com/@sawsaihminewai1980 | Hmine Wai Hmine Wai operates several Telegram channels under his own name, which he has turned into a personal brand. He first opened his Telegram channel, “Hmine Wai,” on 2 December, 2021, where he often forwards content from other pro-junta accounts to his audience. These accounts include “Sergeant Phoe Si,” “Han Nyein Oo,” “Kyaw Swar,” and “Ba Nyunt.” His alternative account, “Captain Hmine Wai” was created on 16 July 2023 and focuses on reporting news and updates from Naypyitaw’s military headquarters, and sharing Ko Thet’s propaganda campaigns. On Telegram, he collaborates with 136 military accounts to launch military propaganda campaigns, and then relies on a network of another 218 channels that are solely responsible for further distributing this content. Many of his collaborators can be found in Ko Thet’s network as well. He utilizes 2 Telegram channels, and 2 TikTok accounts. Although he also used Facebook and YouTube, his accounts were removed from these platforms due to continuous violations of their Community Guidelines and/or Terms of Conditions. Currently, he still does not have any active Facebook or YouTube accounts. |
 Kyaw Swar’s social media accounts/channels: Telegram - https://t.me/kyawswar9690, https://t.me/nan7tele , https://t.me/kyawswar96999, https://t.me/kyawswarks969, https://t.me/Satkker979, https://t.me/thuya110, TikTok - https://www.tiktok.com/@thurailnn YouTube - https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCIPnIcCbpX3J4jnqVykkDLg, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCtpBh92xFDHhi2X_biCRouw | Kyaw Swar Kyaw Swar is the Editor-in-Chief of “Positive Angle News” (PAN). PAN was established in January 2023. He is an Burmese military officer, and supported the military proxy party - Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) - with online campaigns for the 2020 elections. After the 2021 coup, he focused on doxxing pro-revolution supporters, launching an entire doxxing campaign together with Han Nyein Oo and Thazin Oo. He currently manages 12 Telegram channels, with his most active one created in October 2023. He opened a media Telegram channel for PAN in January 2023. One of his Telegram accounts, “Kyaw Swar,” created on 20 October 2023, has 165,000 subscribers, and is connected to 85 military-affiliated channels, including Ko Thet. He also frequently promotes the “Min Chit Oo” account to his audience, which focuses on issues and updates related to Rakhine State. He is utilizing 9 social media accounts, including 1 on TikTok, 6 on Telegram, and 2 on YouTube. Although he also used Facebook and YouTube, his accounts were removed from these platforms due to continuous violations of their Community Guidelines and/or Terms of Conditions. Currently, he still does not have any active Facebook or YouTube accounts. |
 Thazin Oo’s social media accounts/channels: Telegram - https://t.me/Thazinoo969, https://t.me/mmmnew, https://t.me/sinphyushin13, https://t.me/IamThazinOo | Thazin Oo Thazin Oo is a TV presenter for Thuriya Naywun, and for Aung Min’s “Myanmar Hard Talk (MHT) News” TV program. She is currently working as a news anchor for the junta-controlled national media broadcast channel, MRTV, together with Moe Hein. In 2020, she was involved in organizing electoral campaigns for the military proxy party, Union Solidarity and Development Program (USDP). Thazin Oo manages several Telegram channels, one of which was banned due to content and behavior linked to terrorism. After the 2021 coup, she was one of the leaders of a public doxxing campaign targeting those opposing the military. Her most active account was opened in March 2022. She is currently active on at least 8 social media platforms, and includes her 4 Telegram channels, and 1 TikTok account. Although she used Facebook in the past, her accounts were removed from the platform due to continuous violations of their Community Guidelines and/or Terms of Conditions. Currently, she still does not have any active Facebook accounts. |
Conclusion
Although we primarily presented data from Telegram and TikTok for this report, we still conducted research across other popular social media platforms, such as Meta (Facebook), YouTube, and X (Twitter).
Pro-military lobbyists and nationalists mainly used TikTok and Telegram to drive online campaigns that aimed to incite on-the-ground violence. Their content included written posts, photos, and videos, which supporters would then repost on other platforms like Facebook and YouTube using their personal accounts to avoid direct association with the original creators.
The use of TikTok and Telegram for spreading pro-military war propaganda illustrates how these groups have weaponized information and technology to escalate political conflicts in Myanmar and boost their viewer counts for personal gain.
Pro-military propagandists and nationalists shared information on their social media accounts, particularly on Telegram and TikTok, about locations where they believe resistance forces are stationed. They called for the total destruction of these towns and cities, expressing that “all that needs to be left standing is the land,” and that other structures can be rebuilt afterwards. This information, often unverifiable, poses a serious threat to local residents and their property.
TikTok and Telegram have proven largely ineffective in monitoring and removing violent digital campaigns that spread propaganda and incite violence in Myanmar.
Social media platforms have been unsuccessful in removing pro-junta propagandists and preventing their return. Pro-military propagandists and nationalists have built a vast and intricate network of both fake and legitimate accounts across various platforms, ensuring the continued distribution of their content even if some profiles are banned.
There is an urgent need for social media platforms to implement rigorous actor-level moderation and conduct cross-platform investigations to prevent the emergence of further violent digital campaigns that could exacerbate conflicts in Myanmar.
International governments, organizations, and media must address the weaponization of information and technology, including the misuse of social media, and apply greater pressure on social media companies to take stronger accountability in these cases.
Recommended Citation Style -
Myanmar Internet Project (2024, August 23). All that needs to be left standing is the land. https://www.myanmarinternet.info/post/callforaction-en-version
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